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RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
DAVISON M. DOUGLAS*
One of the more contentious issues in America today is the
question of the proper role of religion in our public life. The 2000
election campaign for the Presidency brought this issue once again
to the forefront as the candidates from both major political parties
made clear that their religious beliefs play an important role in
their public policy choices.' Democratic vice presidential candidate
Joseph Lieberman, whose campaign public persona was linked
closely to his deep religious commitments as an Orthodox Jew,
repeatedly emphasized over the course of the campaign the positive
role that religion does and should play in preserving the moral
climate of our country.2 Although Lieberman's comments proved
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William & Mary Law
School
1. Democratic candidate Al Gore announced that he often makes policy decisions by
asking, "What would Jesus do?" Nancy Gibbs, Whose Bully Pulpit Now? When Politics and
Piety Mix, the Real Question is Less What Candidates Say Than What They Plan to Do, TIME,
Sept. 11, 2000, at 38. Republican candidate George Bush, when asked what political
philosopher he most identified with, replied "Christ, because he changed my heart." Darrel
Rowland, Religion Taking Prominent Role in 2000 Election, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 10,
2000, at IA.
2. Lieberman, for example, stated that "[mlorality cannot be maintained without
religion" and, quoting George Washington, noted that "the American people should 'renew
the dedication of our nation and ourselves to God and God's purpose." Michael Hedges,
Lieberman's Rhetoric Revives Debate Over Church and State, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 4,
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controversial,' the religious beliefs of political candidates are
important to many Americans.4 In another recent controversy
concerning religion in public life, the Supreme Court banned
student-led prayer at high school football games in a Texas
community,5 triggering a campaign throughout much of the South
to preserve the tradition of praying before playing.6
This debate over religion in the public square takes place at
multiple levels. Proponents and opponents of the infusion of religion
in public life wage their debate in both constitutional terms,
arguing whether a variety of public acts and statements constitute
unconstitutional establishments of religion, and in normative
terms, arguing whether the direct or indirect support of the
government for religious activity is good social policy. The debate
also considers whether elected officials should rely on their personal
religious beliefs in making policy choices. These are not idle
academic speculations. Critical policy issues of the next few years,
such as school vouchers and the use of religious organizations to
2000, at 26; John Rivera, Unease Over Faith in Politics Campaign: The Anti-Defamation
League says Joseph L Lieberman, Al Gore and George W. Bush Have Stepped Over the Line
in the Way They Have Used Religious References in the Presidential Race, BALT. SUN, Sept.
7, 2000, at 2A. These claims were not novel. Dwight Eisenhower, for example, though
apparently not a deeply religious man himself, claimed that religious faith was a condition
of democracy. See Michele Landsberg, E.B. White Acts Like Good Bacteria on Religious
Frenzy, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 9, 2000, at 1L. Similarly, Ronald Reagan announced that "the
Bible contains 'all the answers to all the problems that face us today.' Editorial, Rendering
Unto Caesar, OMAMAWORLD-HERALD, Sept. 6,2000, at 10. SeegenerallyJoEPHLIEBsRMAN,
IN PRAISE OF PUBLIC LIFE 139-51 (2000) (extolling the importance of religious faith for the
future of the American polity).
3. Lieberman's explicit "God talk" wonhim sharp rebukes from many quarters. See, e.g.,
Rivera, supra note 2, at 24 (citing criticism from Anti-Defamation League); Tom Teepen, Let's
Get Candidates Out of the Pulpit, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Sept, 5, 2000, at 6A (criticizing
Lieberman and other candidates' use of religion in presidential campaign).
4. According to a poll taken prior to the 2000 election, almost sixty percent of Ohio
voters surveyed said that a candidate's religious beliefs were "at least somewhat important"
in deciding for whom they would vote. Rowland, supra note 1, at A. Many political observers
noted the enthusiasm ofmany voters--even those with policy views arguablymore consistent
with the Republican Party-for the Democrat Lieberman precisely because of his religious
devotion. See Howell Raines, When Devotion Counts More Than Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17,2000, § 4, at 18. Recognizing the importance ofreligion to many American voters, a senior
Gore policy adviser announced in 1999 that"the Democratic Party is going to take back God
this time." Rowland, supra note 1, at 1A.
5. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
6. See David Firestone, South's Football Fans Still Stand Up and Pray, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2000, at 1A.
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provide an array of publicly supported social services, undeniably
are linked to this issue of the proper role of religion in public life.
This Symposium was organized for the purpose of exploring some
of the thorny issues of the religion-in-public-life debate. Although
each author was given broad latitude to address his or her own
particular interests within the larger theme, the articles published
here do an excellent job of leading us through some of the most
critical issues in the debate over religion in the public square.
RELIGION IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
One of the threshold issues for those concerned with the role of
religion in public life is the question of the propriety of political
actors relying on their religious understandings in making and
defending their policy choices. This debate has drawn the attention
of legal scholars and political theorists for more than a decade.
Indeed, fifteen years ago, the William and Mary Law Review
published a symposium on religion in American life-also sponsored
by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law-that contained one of the
first scholarly exchanges on this topic.7 That collection of articles
helped shape the "religion and democracy" debate for the next
several years. But, as noted above, this is no mere academic inquiry
as the question of the proper role of religious belief in the policy
choices of elected officials reemerged with a fury during the recent
presidential election.'
Professor Michael Perry has long engaged this issue with a great
deal of perception.' In his essay for this Symposium, Political
Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does Not Violate the
7. SeeKent Greenawalt, TheLimitsofRationality andthePlace ofReligious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and theEnvironment, 27W . &MARYL. REv. 1011 (1986), and responses
to Greenawalt: Michael J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of
Religious Conviction: ProtectingAnimals and the Environment," 27 WM. & MARyL. REV. 1067
(1986); Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075
(1986); Michael E. Smith, ReligiousActivism: The HistoricalRecord, 27 Wm. & MARYL. REV.
1087 (1986); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, To Walk A Crooked Path: Separating Law and
Religion in the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1095 (1986).
8. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS (1997); Michael J. Perry, Liberal
Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1998); Michael J. Perry, Religious
Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1421 (1996).
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Establishment Clause,"0 Perry considers the difficult question of
whether it is constitutionally legitimate for an elected official to rely
on religious beliefs when making policy decisions that disfavor
certain types of conduct such as abortion or same-sex marriage.
Perry concludes that such reliance is not only consistent with
liberal democratic theory, but also does not violate the
Establishment Clause. In reaching this conclusion, Perry argues
that to hold otherwise would violate the "equal citizenship of
religious believers":" "[Sluch... deprivileging [ofl religious grounds
for moral belief relative to secular grounds would be conspicuously
unfair. Such deprivileging would discriminate against religious
grounds for moral belief, thereby subverting the equal citizenship
of religious believers . . .. ,"' In reaching this conclusion, Perry
rejects the argument that there must be an independent secular
ground supporting the religiously grounded decision to disfavor
certain conduct. 13
Professor Steven Smith, in his essay Religion, Democracy, and
Autonomy: A Political Parable,4 asks a question similar to that
posed by Perry: should legislators (or voters or judges) feel free to
rely on their religious beliefs in deciding to disfavor certain conduct
10. Michael J. Perry, Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does Not
Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663 (2001).
11. Id. at 675.
12. Id. at 682.
13. See id. at 675. Perry elaborates:
[F]rom the perspective of many religious believers in the United States, to
forbid legislators to make a political choice on the basis of a moral belief with
a religious ground unless the belief also has a plausible, independent secular
ground... would be to import into the Constitution a controversial conception
of the proper relation between morality and religion, according to which
morality... can and should stand independently of religion .... For such-
Americans, to construe the nonestablishment norm to forbid legislators to base
a political choice on a religiously grounded moral belief unless the belief also
has a plausible, independent secular ground would be to unfairly deprivilege
religious faith (relative to secular belief) as a ground of moral judgment- and
to unfairly deprivilege too, therefore, those moral judgments that cannot stand
independently of religious faith.
Id. at 678-79. For Perry, such a "conception of the proper relation between morality (in the
public square) and religion" should not be accorded "constitutional status in a society in
which the question of the proper relation between morality and religion is so disputed." Id.
at 679.
14. Steven D. Smith, Religion, Democracy, and Autonomy: A Political Parable, 42 WM.
& MARYL. REV. 685 (2001).
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such as abortion and same-sex marriage? Whereas Perry is
primarily interested in whether such reliance is permitted under
the Establishment Clause, Smith's concern is whether reliance on
religious motivations is appropriate in a democratic society.
Dismissing the oft-argued notion that religiously based arguments
are in some sense "inaccessible" to nonbelievers and hence should
be excluded from the political process, Smith focuses instead on the
philosophical argument that democracy is properly grounded in and
dependent upon the autonomy of individual participants in the self-
governing process, and that reliance on religious understandings is
inconsistent with notions of autonomy. 5 Given the emphasis of
many political theorists on Kantian notions of autonomy, Smith
therefore frames the question as whether "the introduction of
religion into public deliberation [i inappropriate because it offends
a justified commitment to autonomy."1" Or, put another way, is
making a policy choice "because God wants it" inconsistent with
notions of autonomy that call for individuals to think and act for
themselves? 7
Smith pursues this question by constructing a political parable
in which various political actors debate the merits of deciding, in
democratic fashion, to sacrifice their autonomy by choosing to defer
to someone-or something-else to make the really difficult policy
choices. Placing himself in the tradition of the law professor who
presents the hypothetical construct without offering resolution,
Smith declines to directly answer his question. But Smith's
fantastical tale clearly calls into question the notion that autonomy
should preclude reliance on religiously based motivations for certain
political choices.
Professor John Witte's essay, A Dickensian Era of Religious
Rights: An Update on Religious Human Rights in Global
15. As Smith notes: "This commitment to autonomy supports a cluster of intertwined
Kantian propositions that have become virtually axiomatic in much modern liberal
democratic theory: that 'autonomy is the supreme good,' that only obligations that we
legislate for ourselves are binding on us, that autonomy is the essential basis of human
dignity .... " Id. at 689 (quoting GERALD DWoRmN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY 8 (1988)).
16. Id. at 691.
17. Id- at 690.
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Perspective,"8 while not directly addressing the issue of the
propriety of relying on religious beliefs in making policy judgments,
nevertheless speaks to it indirectly by arguing that religion must
play a central role in the ongoing struggle to articulate human
rights norms in the modern world. 9 Believing that "human rights
norms need religious narratives to ground them," Witte calls for
religious communities to "reclaim their own voices within the
secular human rights dialogue" and to "play a more active role in
the modern human rights revolution."0 Witte concedes that his
thesis may appear counterintuitive because of the vast array of
human rights abuses that have been perpetrated over the years in
the name of religion, and the many ways in which religion has
"helped to perpetuate bigotry, chauvinism, and violence."2 Yet
relying in part on the long-though often ignored-theological
embrace by Christianity, Judaism, and Islam of basic human rights
norms, and the central role that religious groups have played in the
modern human rights revolution, Witte argues that religious
institutions can and should continue to play a vital role in the
ongoing struggle to secure protection for human rights around the
world.2 To better perform this role, Witte urges religious groups to
"reclaim the human rights voices within their own internal religious
dialogues."'
18. John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on Religious
Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 707 (2001).
19. Witte writes:
Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and human communities.
Religions invariably provide many of the sources and "scales ofvalues" by which
many persons and communities govern themselves .... Religions must thus be
seen as indispensable allies in the modern struggle for human rights. To
exclude them from the struggle is impossible, indeed catastrophic.
Id. at 713.
20. Id. at 714.
21. Id. at 715.
22. Witte notes that"the theory and law of human rights are neither new nor secular in
origin. Human rights are, in no small part, the modern political fruits of ancient religious
beliefs and practices ... ." Id. at 714.
23. Id.
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GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
One of the central issues in both contemporary Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and political debates over the proper
relationship of government and religion is that of government aid
to religious institutions. Professor Ira Lupu, in his essay,
Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell
v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause,2 notes a
divergence in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. In cases that Lupu describes as "government
message" cases, in which the government sponsors a religious
message, a majority of the Court remains committed to a
separationist perspective. This perspective was reflected most
recently in the Court's Santa Fe decision in which a six-justice
majority declared unconstitutional a local school policy that allowed
a student to deliver a prayer before a public high school football
game.' Indeed, argues Lupu, "[w]hat remains of the popular notion
of 'separation of church and state' has little if anything to do with
churches; rather, the remnants of separationism attach most
doggedlyto questions of state sponsorship of religious messages and
themes."2
6
In cases involving various types of government financial aid to
religious institutions, however, Lupu notes that the Court over the
course of the past decade has rejected the Burger Court's strong
separationist stance. As Lupu notes, the Court's recent plurality
decision in Mitchell v. Helms' "explicitly overrule several Burger-
Era precedents on the subject of school aid and opens the door to
substantial provision of in-kind benefits by government to all
schools, including the most sectarian among them."8 Indeed,
religious institutions, such as schools or welfare providers,
increasingly are performingimportant social services for which they
24. Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v.
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WMI. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2001).
25. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
26. Lupu, supra note 24, at 774.
27. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
28. Lupu, supra note 24, at 773.
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receive explicit government support-and now with the blessing of
the Court.
This divergence of judicial interpretation of these two
paradigmatic Establishment Clause claims, Lupu argues,
constitutes a departure from eighteenth-century concerns. During
the late eighteenth century, government financial aid to religious
institutions was fiercely resisted, whereas some government
sponsorship of religious messages was tolerated.29 Lupu attributes
the recent shift in the Court's jurisprudence to a variety of cultural
factors-pluralism, egalitarianism, secularism, prosperity, an
expanded role for government in the provision of social services, and
a revolution in communications-that help "to explain the rising
trajectory of constitutional concerns about government speech and
the falling trajectory of comparable concerns about government
money."30 Moreover, a majority on the Court now embraces a theory
of neutrality, pursuant to which the government must treat
religious groups the same as other nonsectarian private groups
when distributing its largesse.
Professor Marci Hamilton, in her essay Free? Exercise,3 also
addresses the question of government aid to religious institutions.
Hamilton, like Lupu, notes the Court's increasing acceptance of this
kind of assistance, 2 and strongly argues from both history and
constitutional doctrine that such governmental aid is unwise as a
matter of both constitutional law and policy. Outlining the many
different ways in which religious institutions receive direct or
indirect financial aid from the state-such as tax exemptions, aid
to religious schools, and financial support for the provision of social
services-Hamilton argues that these payments offend Madisonian
notions that the government should not be supporting churches.
33
But Hamilton goes further. Not only does such aid violate the
Establishment Clause, it is unwise public policy, as neutrality
principles require the government not to discriminate among
29. As Lupu notes, "What the Virginians and others did fight about [in the eighteenth
century], and what then became the primary focus in our legacy ofnonestablishment, was
not government speech. It was government money." Id. at 777.
30. Id. at 788.
31. Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823 (2001).
32. See id. at note 123 and accompanying text.
33. See id. at 835-42.
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institutional recipients, even though such discrimination may be
desirable: "When the Luciferians want to assist troubled youth or
the Ku Klux Klan seeks to oversee welfare-to-work, they cannot be
rejected on the basis of their theology.""'
Hamilton also argues the converse: not only is government aid to
religious institutions bad for the state (and society), it also is bad
for the religious recipients of the aid. Hamilton contends that as
religious institutions take more and more government money, their
agendas invariably will be compromised by the state: "As religion
becomes the beggar, . .. asking for this amount of money for this
mission at this particular time, government will become the
enslaver, capable of demanding accountability and loyalty.""
Hamilton outlines how this has occurred in the arts-funding
context.
36
Professor Carl Esbeck, on the other hand, welcomes the
jurisprudential shift favoring government aid to religious
institutions. Esbeck, who in an important earlier article laid out a
doctrinal justification for government aid to religious social service
providers," argues in his essay Religion and the First Amendment:
Some Causes of the Recent Confusion,"8 that the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Mitchell v. Helms,9 Agostini v. Felton, ° and
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of University of Virginia,"1 which
legitimated various forms of government aid to religious
institutions, are consistent with both the mandates of the
Establishment Clause and neutrality principles that oblige the
state not to discriminate against religious institutions.
34. Id. at 877.
35. Id. at 876-77.
36. See id. at 842-50.
37. See Carl H. Esbeck,A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1997).
38. Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent
Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (2001)
39. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (upholding various types ofgovernment aid to religious schools
such as computers).
40. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding provision of remedial education to students in
religious schools and in process reversing prior Supreme Court precedent).
41. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that university must fund religious publication in order
to avoid viewpoint discrimination).
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SCHOOL VOUCHERS
One of the central ways in which the state financially supports
religious institutions is through various types of aid to sectarian
schools. Such aid programs have loomed large in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than half a
century. Perhaps the most dramatic and controversial example of
this type of aid today is the provision of school vouchers to those
parents whose children attend private religious schools. Cleveland,
Milwaukee, and Florida each have established voucher programs,42
and both California and Michigan recently considered-but
rejected-statewide programs in November 2000 ballot initiatives.'
The Court's decision this past summer in Mitchell v. Helms
confirmed its increasing willingness to countenance government aid
to religious institutions provided that it is done on a neutral basis,
but Mitchell left open the question whether the government
provision of school vouchers violates the Establishment Clause."
Professor Neal Devins, in his essay Social Meaning and School
Vouchers,45 offers a robust defense of school vouchers on both
normative and constitutional grounds. Devins argues that courts,
confronted with arguments that school vouchers violate the
Establishment Clause, should engage in "a type of minimalist
42. See Ellen Belcher, Voucher Debate Focuses on Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Jan. 7,
2001, at 6B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dayton Daily News File (describing
Cleveland voucher program); Tamara Henry & Anthony DeBarros, Vouchers Enter Second
Decade: Milwaukee Finds No Easy Answers in School Choice, USATODAY, Oct. 24,2000, at
1D, available in LEXIS, News Library, USA Today File (describing Milwaukee voucher
program); KimberlyMiller, Special Education VouchersFindFew Takers, PALMBEACHPOST,
Nov. 19, 2000, at 1C, available in LEXIS, News Library, Palm Beach Post File (describing
Florida voucher program).
43. See Mark Hornbeck & Tom Kiska, Vouchers Denied: Michigan Voters Say No to
Proposal 1, DET. NEWS, Nov. 8,2000, at Front 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Detroit
News File; Greg Lucas & Nanette Asimov, Californians Again Turn Down Vouchers for
Private Schools; Limits on Local Fees, Private Contracting for State Backed by Voters, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 8, 2000, at A9, available in LEXIS, News Library, San Francisco Chronicle
File.
44. Indeed, the decisive two-justice concurrence of O'Connor and Breyer in Mitchell
specifically noted that no government funds "ever reach the coffers of a religious school," thus
suggesting that these two swing justices regard the voucher issue as unsettled. Mitchell v.
Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530,2562 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919
(2001).
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decision making that allows states and municipalities to
experiment" with voucher plans.4 6 Devins suggests it would be
"truly tragic"' 7 to short circuit such plans by finding them to be
unconstitutional establishments of religion, as certain lower courts
have already done.48 Devins grounds this argument in his view that
courts should consider the "social meaning" of those government
actions subject to constitutional challenge. For Devins, the social
meaning of school vouchers has radically shifted in the past two
decades, and as a result, many of the constitutional concerns with
vouchers have dissipated. In particular, Devins argues that school
vouchers are no longer seen as instruments of racial segregation-a
widespread concern with such plans twenty years ago-and
Catholic schools, one of the' primary educational alternatives to
public schools, have undergone a dramatic "secularization" in recent
years that should reduce anxieties about religious indoctrination
and the "pervasively sectarian" nature of religious schools.49 Devins
notes that the rhetoric of voucher opponents has shifted in
significant measure away from constitutional concerns about the
"state facilitating private religious instruction" to more pragmatic
concerns like "the need to invest in public schools." 0 As a result, in
the contemporary debate over vouchers, "religion has taken a back
seat" to secular concerns about educational quality in urban
schools.51 As an historical matter, Devins argues that courts, in
resolving earlier constitutional disputes, have been influenced by
larger social meanings; such influence continues to be appropriate
46. Id. at 961.
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (striking
down voucher program in Cleveland on Establishment Clause grounds), affd, Nos. 00-
3055/3060/3063, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000); Holmes v. Bush,
2000 WL 526364, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14,2000) (striking down Florida voucher plan on
state constitutional grounds).
49. See Devins, supra note 45, at 942-43. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme
Court was particularly suspicious of "pervasively sectarian" institutions when conducting
Establishment Clause analyses. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985),
overruled by Agostiniv. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); School Dist. of GrandRapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 385 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
50. Devins, supra note 45, at 921.
51. Id. at 953.
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and should cause courts to take a restrained view when considering
the constitutionality of school vouchers.52
Professor James Dwyer, in his essay School Vouchers: Inviting
the Public Into the Religious Square,53 also argues for the normative
benefits of vouchers as well as their constitutionality. Dwyer's
policy arguments for vouchers, however, differ from those of most
voucher proponents. Dwyer notes at the outset that those who
decline public services have no general claim on government
resources to subsidize their private choices. Privately educated
children, however, pose a unique set of problems. Because the
decision to decline public services by enrolling in private schools is
made not by children, but by their parents, and many parents may
make poor choices on behalf of their children in the pursuit of
certain ideological objectives, Dwyer argues that children in certain
poorly operated and equipped private schools have their own
right-apart from their parents--"to a fair share of state spending
on education."54 Therefore, Dwyer concludes, "as a matter of
fairness and as a matter of constitutional principle, every state in
this country must create a voucher program."5
Having concluded that school vouchers should be required for
many children, Dwyer considers their constitutionality. He
concludes that they are unconstitutional establishments of religion
if they are not accompanied by "regulatory strings ... needed to
ensure that children in [the recipient] private schools receive a good
secular education."56 Without such supervisory attention by the
state, Dwyer argues, these programs would be unconstitutional. As
to arguments that such regulation unconstitutionally intrudes on
52. Indeed, Devins argues that "the changing social meaning of school choice suggests
that vouchers neither violate equal educational opportunity nor Establishment Clause
prohibitions." Id- at 959.
53. James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public into the Religious Square, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 963 (2001).
54. Id. at 977.
55. IM at 978.
56. Id. at 992. The Court's most recent decision legitimizing the distribution of
government aid to religious institutions acknowledged, at least implicitly, such a supervisory
role when it held that such aid "to further some legitimate secular purpose" can be provided
to private religious institutions so long as the recipients "adequately further that [secular]
purpose." Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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the operation of the private schools, Dwyer argues that the school
can avoid this regulation by simply declining the voucher aid.
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Since the Supreme Court's 1990 decision inEmploymentDivision
v. Smith,57 both politicians and scholars have engaged in spirited
debates of the merits of the Court's holding that the government
need not show a compelling, narrowly tailored interest to justify its
neutral regulations that impose a burden on the free exercise of
religion. In response, Congress enacted by an overwhelming margin
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which in effect
reversed Smith, requiring the state to justify its neutral laws that
impose a burden on the free exercise of religion by demonstrating
a compelling interest. Although the Supreme Court struck down
RFRA on grounds that Congress lacked the power to so legislate,"
Congress has continued to consider legislation to accomplish similar
legislative goals through other constitutional means.5 9 On the
academic front, numerous scholars have argued that the Court in
Smith misconstrued the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.6 °
In response to Smith, many legislatures have enacted statutes
that provide an exemption for religious individuals or institutions
57. 492 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise Clause does not require State of
Oregon to grant an exemption from its drug laws for members of Native American Church
who smoke peyote as part of their religious observations).
58. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
59. For example, Congress has recently considered enactment of a Religious Liberty
Protection Act (RLPA) that would require the state to justify its neutral laws that infringe
the free exercise of religion by a compelling government interest; to avoid the Court's Boerne
decision, RLPA is grounded in Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See Lisa
SchultsBressman,Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42WM. & MARYL. REV. 1007,1038-39
& nn. 119-20, 122 (2001). Congress enacted in 2000 a Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act that forbids the state from imposing a "substantial burden" on
religious exercise through land use regulations absent a compelling interest. See David
O'Reilly, New Federal Law Reduces Clout of Zoning Boards Over Houses of Worship, PHEL.
INQUIRER, Oct. 27, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Philadelphia Inquirer File.
60. See, e.g., James D. Gordon I, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91
(1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W.
McConnell,FreeExerciseRevisionism and the SmithDecision, 57 U. CmI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm.
L. REv. 308 (1991).
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from otherwise generally applicable laws.6' For example, the
Oregon legislature created a statutory exemption from its drug laws
for Native Americans who smoke peyote for religious reasons.62 The
courts generally have found such exemptions, or permissive
accommodations, to be constitutional. 3
Professor Lisa Bressman, in her article Accommodation and
Equal Liberty64 offers a sophisticated critique of why permissive
accommodations for religious institutions and individuals violate
constitutional commitments to equality grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In order to reconcile
constitutional principles of both free exercise and equality,
Bressman proposes that legislatures "respond to religious requests
for accommodation on a permissive basis as long as they are
prepared to extend any such accommodation to similarly situated
nonreligious claimants." 5 Bressman concedes that her standard
may impose some administrative difficulties, but urges that
commitments to equality require that such difficulties be
surmounted to justify granting legislative exemptions from
generally applicable laws in the name of protecting liberty.
Professor Esbeck, on the other hand, argues in his essay that
permissive accommodations violate neither the Establishment
Clause nor commitments to equality since such legislative action
61. See Bressman, supra note 59, at 1022-23.
62. See OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992 (1999).
63. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding
exemption of religious organizations from employment discrimination laws).
64. Bressman, supra note 59, at 1007.
65. Id. at 1014. Bressman's analysis might also call into question those laws that do not
grant an exemption to religious institutions from generally applicable laws, but that also
single out religious individuals for protection from adverse private action. For example,
employment discrimination laws mandate that private employers not discharge an employee
because of the employee's religious activities or affiliations, but offer no such protection to
employees who are fired because of their nonreligious activities or affiliations, such as
volunteering in an AIDS clinic. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting discrimination in workplace because of religion of
employee and defining religion to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief"'); Brunnerv. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (1990) (finding no wrongful discharge
for firing employee because of volunteer work in AIDS clinic). Employment discrimination
laws that favor religious commitments over similar secular commitments might violate
Bressman's principle of equal liberty.
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"reduces civic/religious tensions and minimizes governmental
intrusions into religious matters, both objectives that help maintain
the separate spheres of church and state so sought after by the
Establishment Clause."66
The debate over religion in public life is as spirited as ever, as the
presidential campaign of 2000 served to remind us. Many
Americans welcome the embrace of a public role for religious
institutions and belief that several political candidates articulated
in their quest for high office. Others criticize such language and
policy proposals as inconsistent with the principles of a modern
secular democracy. This debate will not go away. Hopefully,
however, the essays in this Symposium will offer some guidance to
those seeking to better understand the proper role for religion in
our public life.
66. Esbeck, supra note 38, at 906; see supra text accompanying note 37.
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